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THE CONCEPT OF AN "EARNED FEE" IN THE
REGULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY
THE LOUSIANA SUPREME COURT
The regulation of attorney's fees by the Louisiana Supreme
Court recently has undergone change in light of the overruling of
long-standing jurisprudence and a reinterpretation of certain legisla-
tion. In three opinions' the court examined the attorney-client rela-
tionship and decided that the client's interests at all times must be
kept separate from those of his attorney. A major factor in the
court's new approach was the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), which the court expressly approved as the primary authority
on the subject of attorney's fees. Significantly, the court determined
that the Code envisions that attorneys receive compensation only
for "earned fees" and that the client's right to discharge his at-
torney should not be limited.
In reaching the conclusions in each of the recent cases, the
supreme court relied on both its plenary judicial power to regulate
the legal profession' and its constitutional grant of original jurisdic-
tion in disciplinary proceedings.' At an earlier time, the court had
adopted as "rules of the court"' the Articles of Incorporation of the
Louisiana State Bar Association, which contain the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. Thus, the rules of the bar association, when
approved by the supreme court, have the force and effect of
1. Scott v. Kemper Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 66 (La. 1979); Calk v. Highland Constr. &
Mfg. Co., 376 So. 2d 495 (La. 1979); Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102
(La. 1979).
2. LA. CONST. art. V. § 1 provides: "The judicial power is vested in a supreme
court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts authorized by this article." LA.
CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one
of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power
belonging to either of the others."
3. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(B) provides: "The supreme court has exclusive original
jurisdiction of disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar." It has been sug-
gested that the judiciary's power over the legal profession derives solely from its
plenary power and that the constitution's grant of exclusive, original jurisdiction to the
supreme court over disciplinary matters should be considered as merely divesting
lower courts in the state of any jurisdiction on this subject. See Patterson & Hardin,
Discharged Counsef" The Dilemma Solved?, 28 LA. B.J. 177, 178 (1981).
4. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d at 109. In 1970 the court
adopted amendments to the articles of incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar




substantive law." The recent case law clearly illustrates the court's
broad application of the Code as law in the exercise of judicial
supervision over the attorney-client relationship.
The History of the Court's Regulation of Attorney's Fees
Early Theories
The relationship between an attorney and his client is a special
one which has proven difficult to define. The Code describes the
attorney-client relationship as having both personal and fiduciary
characteristics! The attorney is required to act in furtherance of his
client's behalf to the extent of the attorney's ability; in return, the
client owes the attorney adequate compensation. The attorney-client
relationship conveys a representative capacity upon the attorney.
Primarily because of the attorney's role, this relationship is often
classified as one of mandate and not as a hiring of labor.' Troplong,
the French legal scholar, considered attorneys as mandataries, "say-
ing that a contract for their employment cannot be received as a
contract for hiring of labor, that the honoraire [remuneration] is
proper to the mandate, while the price is proper to the hiring [of
labor] ... -.
Louisiana jurisprudence consistently has considered the
attorney-client relationship as one of mandate." The nature of the
mandate, however, has been the subject of both litigation and
legislation. Courts generally have classified the mandate as either
5. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582 (1942). "Under
the court's admitted inherent power to admit attorneys to practice, it has adopted
rules prescribing certain qualifications which must be complied with by the applicant
as a condition to obtaining his license. These regulations are unquestionably ones of
substantive law." Id at 590.
6. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 3-1 (found in ARTICLES OF INCOR-
PORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app.) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
7. Gurley v. City of New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75, 5 So. 659 (1889).
8. 41 La. Ann. at 79, 5 So. at 661 (quoting Troplong).
9. Louque v. Dejean, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911); Gurley v. City of New'
Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75, 5 So. 659 (1889); Wright v. Fontana, 290 So. 2d 449 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974); Lynch v. Burglas, 286 So. 2d 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Woodley v.
Robinson, 100 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
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revocable at will 0 or as coupled with an interest." If deemed a man-
date coupled with an interest, courts have had the additional burden
of determining the nature of that interest."
Revocable Mandate
Early Louisiana courts followed the revocable mandate theory
because "'the principal may revoke his power of attorney whenever
he thinks proper."" ' This interpretation prevented an attorney from
acquiring an interest in his client's claim." Problems arose when at-
torneys were discharged and prevented from completing the tasks
for which they had been engaged. The older jurisprudence con-
sistently used quantum meruit" to detemine the value of work done
by an attorney who was discharged early."6
Mandate With an Interest
In more recent times, some courts began to deviate from this
general mandate principle"? by allowing attorneys to acquire an in-
terest in the client's litigation. However, the judiciary was unable to
10. Louque v. Dejean, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911). See also Gravity Drainage
Dist., No. 2 v. Edwards, 207 La. 1, 20 So. 2d 405 (1944); Foster, Hall, Barret & Smith v.
Haley, 174 La. 1019, 142 So. 251 (1932); Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1980); Kramer v. Graham, 272 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Woodley v.
Robinson, 100 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
11. Succession of Jones, 193 La. 360, 190 So. 581 (1939); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co.
v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937); Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So.
775 (1916).
12. Succession of Vlaho, 140 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
13. Louque v. Dejean, 129 La. 519, 524, 56 So. 427, 428 (1911) (citation omitted).
14. Stiles v. Bruton, 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1914); Louque v. Dejean. 129 La. 519,
56 So. 427 (1911).
15. "Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine, based fundamentally on the concept
that no one who benefits by the labor and incidental materials of another should be un-
justly enriched thereby; and that the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable
amount for labor, materials, etc. furnished, even in the absence of a specific contract
therefor." Bordelon Motors, Inc. v. Thompson, 176 So. 2d 836, 837 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965).
16. Succession of Robinson, 188 La. 742, 178 So. 337 (1937); Louque v. Dejean, 129
La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911); Chiasson v. Law Firm of Dragon & Kellner, 335 So. 2d 87
(La App. 3d Cir. 1976); Succession of Mariana, 177 So. 464 (Orl. App. 1937). The princi-
ple that the attorney-client relationship is one of revocable mandate is today still con-
sistent with the Code which recognizes the fiduciary relationship an attorney has with
his client and the client's unrestricted right to discharge his attorney. See CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Supra note 6, at EC 4-1.
17. See note 9, supra.
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decide upon the exact nature of the interest the attorney acquired.
The courts also had difficulty in fashioning a clear rationale between
those attorneys who were dismissed for cause and those who were
dismissed without cause.8
The Contingency Fee and Act 124 of 1906
The development of the use of the contingency fee contract
greatly influenced the legislature and the judiciary in their construc-
tion of the attorney-client relationship as one of a mandate coupled
with an interest. In Act 124 of 1906 the Louisiana legislature
recognized contingency fee contracts as allowing an attorney to ac-
quire as a fee "an interest in the subject matter of the [litigation]."'"
The Act was the source of Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 which
provides, in part:
By written contract signed by his client, an attorney at law
may acquire as his fee an interest in the subject matter of a suit,
proposed suit, or claim in the assertion, prosecution or defense
of which he is employed, whether the claim or suit be for money
or for property. In such contract, it may be stipulated that
neither the attorney nor the client may, without the written con-
sent of the other, settle, compromise, release, discontinue or
otherwise dispose of the suit or claim .... [Such disposition] by
either the attorney or the client, without the written consent of
the other, is null and void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded
with as if no such settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or
other disposition had been made.
Initially, Act 124 was not followed strictly by the courts. In an
early decision the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to give "un-
qualified assent to the rigor of the rule that the contract in such
cases is 'the law between the parties and that as a party binds
himself, so shall he be bound."'" However, eventually this limited
construction of the statute was abandoned in favor of one based on
freedom of contract. The judiciary slowly adopted the view that an
attorney could acquire an interest in his client's suit and even have
some authority over the client's control of the litigation. In time,
courts began to hold expressly that contingency fee contracts ex-
18. This distinction was the basis of the decision in Saucier by the fourth circuit.
353 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
19. 1906 La. Acts. No. 124.
20. Husk v. Blanchard, 155 La. 816, 99 So. 610 (1924).
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ecuted pursuant to Revised Statutes 37:218 were "the law between
the parties."'"
When an attorney and his client executed a section 37:218 con-
tingency fee contract, the attorney would, according to the statute,
"acquire an interest in the subject matter of the suit."2 However,
tribunals often found difficulty in determining the exact nature of
this interest.23 In several cases the attorney-client relationship was
interpreted as one of mandate with the attorney acquiring a "vested
interest" in the litigation.2' Thus an attorney who fulfilled the re-
quirements of the statute could be dismissed only when the client
had cause for so doing. Obviously, this rationale contradicted the
principle that the client should exercise complete control of the
lawsuit. In contrast to this anomalous result, other courts inter-
preted the attorney's interest in the litigation as not being a vested
one. For example, in Succession of Vlaho6 the provisions of Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 37:218 were construed strictly and the court
expressed that "the attorney has no vested interest in the client's
suit or claim and obtains no vested interest therein even where the
contract in express terms grants such an interest to him."26
While the exact nature of this interest that the attorney enjoyed
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 was never agreed upon
completely, the courts required more than the mere filing of the con-
tract to allow the attorney to avail himself of the statute's provi-
sions. In Guilbeau v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.2 the attorney's
only work done in a tort case was the filing of the suit one day
before prescription ran and the execution of a contingency fee con-
tract in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218. Con-
cluding that the "statute envisions an earned fee," the court refused
to allow the attorney to use the provisions of section 37:218 and
determined that quantum meruit would be the proper standard for
fixing the amount of compensation due the attorney. 8
21. Singleton v. Bunge Corp., 364 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Guilbeau v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Dickerson v. Scholvin,
261 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
22. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950 & Supp. 1975).
23. Succession of Jones, 193 La. 360, 190 So. 581 (1939); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co.
v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937): Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So.
775 (1916); Succession of Vlaho. 140 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
24. See authorities cited in note 23, supra.
25. 140 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
26. I at 231.
27. 293 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 218. The court's interpretation of the statute envisioning an earned fee
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The client's control of the lawsuit was weakened further by the
judiciary's acceptance of the provision in section 218 which allows
the attorney and client to stipulate that neither party may settle,
compromise, or otherwise dispose of the suit without the other's
permission. If the client settled or compromised the suit without the
permission of the attorney, the agreement would "be null and
void."2 In an early interpretation of this provision, the supreme
court held "that the only method which the statute . . . provides,
whereby the plaintiff in a suit can be prevented from exercising the
right . . . of compromising and discontinuing the [suit] is the inser-
tion in the written contract of employment, between him and his at-
torney, of a stipulation to that effect. ... 30
However, the fourth circuit, when faced with the question
whether such a stipulation could be "construed as limiting the
client's right not to prosecute an appeal," refused to adopt such a
construction."' The panel analyzed the jurisprudence concerning the
statute and found that "the only effect which a contingent fee con-
tract entered into in compliance with . . . [Louisiana Revised
Statutes] 37:218 has is to limit to such extent as may be stipulated
therein the client's otherwise ever-existing right to settle or other-
wise dispose of his suit or claim at will.132
Some early cases hold that when a "no compromise without con-
sent" stipulation is included in a section 37:218 contingency fee con-
tract, the client is prohibited from trying to prevent the attorney
from completing the case." If the client interfered with the attorney
in such a way as to prevent settlement of the suit, the client would
be liable to the extent of the contract. To arrive at this result,
courts often applied Civil Code article .2040 which provides that,
"the condition is considered fulfilled, when the fullfillment of it has
is consistent with the supreme court's rationale in Saucier, Calk, and Scott. See note
74, infra, and accompanying text.
29. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950 & Supp. 1975).
30. Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. at 484, 71 So. at 775. The court further held
that the stipulation would "not necessarily be binding on the defendant, unless the con-
tract with the stipulation in it is served upon him as required by the statute." Id In
1975 the statute was amended and the requirement of service upon the defendant was
removed. However, the provision requiring the filing of the contract with the clerk of
court where the action was pending or was to take place or at the domicile of the
client was retained. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950 & Supp. 1975).
31. Succession of Vlaho, 140 So. 2d at 231.
32. Id
33. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937);
D'Avricourt v. Seeger, 169 La. 620, 125 So. 735 (1929).
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been prevented by the party bound to perform it." Therefore, the
client was liable if the attorney was prevented from completing the
condition (settlement of the case) for which his contingency fee con-
tract was based.3'
Thus, at least until recent times, Louisiana courts tended to
allow attorneys an interest in the subject matter of a client's litiga-
tion if a section 37:218 contingency fee contract had been executed.
The contracts would be enforced if the statutory requirements were
met and if the attorney actually performed some legal work in the
client's behalf.
Recent Regulation of Attorney's Fees
The "Earned Fee"
Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products35 was the first case in a trilogy
of recent decisons marking a departure from previous judicial inter-
pretations of the attorney-client relationship. The client in Saucier
was injured in an automobile accident. He hired an attorney and
signed a 331/3 percent contingency fee contract in accordance with
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218. Three years after the suit was
filed (and approximately four years after the accident) Saucier
dismissed the first attorney. Saucier hired another lawyer with
whom he also signed an identical 331/3 percent contingency fee con-
tract. This second attorney was able to settle the suit quickly and
obtain a $75,000 award. The first attorney then sought a full one-
third of the award. The trial judge instead, on the basis of quantum
meruit, awarded this attorney only $3,000 plus medical expenses
which the attorney had incurred upon his client's behalf. The fourth
circuit modified the trial court's judgment and awarded the first at-
torney one-third of the judgment, as the original contract had pro-
vided." On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed
this decision. 7 After the first hearing before the supreme court, the
$75,000 judgment was to be divided as follows: $25,000 to the first
attorney, $25,000 to the second attorney, and the remaining $25,000
to the client. However, on rehearing, the supreme court reversed,
four to three."
34. See cases cited in note 33, supra.
35. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
36. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 353 So.. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
37. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods.. Inc.. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979).
38. Justice Calogero, writing for the majority on rehearing, noted the rehearing




On rehearing, the court held that Louisiana Revised Statutes
37:218 could not be construed to allow an attorney a vested interest
in the subject matter of the client's litigation.39 Notably, the court
based this decision specifically on the Code of Professional Respon.
sibility." Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, quoted from
39. Id. at 115.
40. The majority relied specifically on the following provisions of the Code:
DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of Interest in Litigation.
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he
may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
DR 2-106 Fees for Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of or-
dinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the
fee is in excess of reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in de-
termining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty, and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the par-
ticular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per,
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
(A) In general
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment should refund promptly any
part of a fee paid in advance that he has not earned.
(B) Mandatory withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client . . . shall withdraw from employment, if:
(4) lie is discharged by his client.
The comment to Rule 1.5 of the 1981 FINAL DaArr OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT provides:
(Rielevant factors in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the novelty
and difficulty of the matter; the skill, standing and experience of the lawyer; the
time involved: the urgency of the matter; the degree of contingency; the effect in
preempting the lawyer's opportunity to represent other clients; the fact that the
relationship is a continuing one; the amount involved and the results obtained; the




Justice Dennis' dissent on the original hearing:
Under our rules an attorney may contract with a client to
provide legal services for a fee contingent and calculated upon
the amount recovered or preserved, so long as the contract does
not restrict the client's right with or without cause to discharge
the attorney, or grant as a fee to the attorney without require-
ment of commensurate services an immutable proprietary
percentage of the client's claim, or result in an attorney collect-
ing a "clearly excessive" fee which has not been "earned" as
defined by the rules."
The interest conveyed by the statute was interpreted as merely a
"privilege granted to aid the attorney's collection of a fully earned
fee .. ..
Reasoning that the Disciplinary Rules permit only an "earned
fee," the court "conclude[d] that only one contingency fee should be
paid by the client, the amount of the fee to be determined according
to the highest ethical contingency percentage to which the client
contractually agreed in any of the contingency fee contracts he ex-
ecuted."'" The fee apportionment was to be figured "on the basis of
the factors which are set forth in the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility ..."" and not on the basis of quantum meruit.5
The Attorney's "Privilege"
Statutory contingency fee contracts were examined further in
Calk v. Highland Construction & Manufacturing." In Calk, the
supreme court, applying Saucier, held that "R.S. 37:218 gives the at-
torney who has a written contract affording him an 'interest' in the
claim, a privilege to the extent of his earned fee on any recovery ob-
tained by the settlement."7
The Calk court also had to decide whether this privilege primed
the rights of a seizing creditor. In Calk the contingency fee contract
was not recorded. Tracing the legislative history of Louisiana Re-
41. 373 So. 2d at 117 (emphasis added).
42. Id (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 118.
44. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at DR 2-106(B).
45. 373 So. 2d at 118. The case was remanded to the trial court for determination
of the allocation of the fee. The court further held that the second attorney must be
joined as an indispensable party. Id. at 119.
46. 376 So. 2d 495 (La. 1979).
47. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
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vised Statutes 37:218, the court held that the statute "was intended
to give attorneys comparable rights as are given in R.S. 9:5001.""1
Section 5001 provides attorneys a special privilege on judgments
they secure. This privilege is effective even if unrecorded. The court
in Calk held that Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 applied only to
settlements and not judgments." Considering their common origin,
the majority concluded that both provisions were intended to assist
attorneys in collecting their fees and, by analogy, held that a con-
tingency fee agreement made pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 37:218 "does not have to be recorded to be effective."'O To
protect himself, the attorney must assert "his claim by intervention
or other legal proceedings prior to disbursement of the proceeds to
a third party.""
The Right to Settle
The final case in the trilogy, Scott v. Kemper Insurance Co.,"
arose when a discharged attorney sought to have his client's settle-
ment declared null because he and the client had signed a contin-
gency fee contract with a "no settlement without consent' '1 stipula-
tion-a stipulation allowed by the last sentence of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 37:218.'
The court relied on both Saucier and Calk and held that the last
sentence of the statutes could not be applied literally. The majority
cited 'Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-110(B) of the Code which "recognized
the client's absolute right to discharge his attorneys."65 .While
acknowledging that a lawyer may contract with a client for a con-
tingency fee, the majority also acknowledged that the Code
"specifically prohibits . . . an attorney's acquiring a proprietary in-
terest in the client's cause of action ... ,s' The court again noted
48. Id. LA. R.S. 9:5001 (1950) provides: "A special privilege is hereby granted to
attorneys at law for the amount of their professional fees on all judgments obtained by
them, and on the property recovered thereby, either as plaintiff or defendant, to take
rank as a first privilege thereon."
49. Id.
50. Id. "In 1950 when [the] statutes were revised, Act 124 of 1906 was split into
two separate statutes, R.S. 9:5001, containing the first paragraph ... and R.S. 37:218,
containing the second paragraph. With only some minor amendments, this is the state
of the law today." Id.
51. Id
52. 377 So. 2d 66 (La. 1979).
53. Id at 67.
54. See text accompanying note 18, supra.
55. 377 So. 2d at 69.
56. Id. at 70.
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that the legislative intent in passing Louisiana Revised Statutes
37:218 was to prevent the discharged attorney from being deprived
of his fee. Thus, while the last sentence could not be applied literal-
ly, the court held that if an
attorney with a written contingency fee contract bearing the no
consent stipulation "file[s] and records it with the clerk of court
in the parish in which the suit is pending," then a defendant who
disburses the settlement proceeds without ascertaining and pay-
ing the fee to which the attorney is due, will do so to his preju-
dice."
The supreme court, distinguishing Scott from Calk, further held
that the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 must be
complied with fully by the attorney. "Unlike ... Calk, where recor-
dation ... of the contract is irrelevant in a contest between an at-
torney and the client's creditor, imposition of an obligation upon the
client's obligor in its suit to retain settlement funds until determina-
tion of fee entitlement is dependent upon the attorney's full com-
pliance with R.S. 37:218. ..
The Future
These three cases have transformed completely the meaning of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218 from a statute that allows at-
torneys to obtain a vested interest in a client's litigation to one that
affords the attorney merely a privilege to any settlement his client
might obtain.6' To interpret the statute in this manner, the court ful-
ly exerted its plenary power to control the conduct of the state bar
and to regulate the profession in general.u However, these decisions
resulted in several unanswered questions relating to attorney-client
relations.
The Single Contingency Fee
In Saucier, and again in Scott, the court held that "only one con-
tingency fee should be paid by the client, the amount of the fee to
be determined according to the highest ethical contingency percent-
age to which the client contractually agreed . .."" This approach,
said the court, would "discourage professional disputes[,] ...en-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d at 118;
60. See discussion at notes 2-5, supra, and accompanying text.
61. 373 So. 2d at 118.
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courage out of court settlements ... [and] assure fair treatment of
the client .... 2
However, such a result may be problematical. First, two at-
torneys both may do a substantial amount of work on a case and a
single contingency fee simply would be inadequate to compensate
them both. Contingency fee contracts are said to allow greater ac-
cess to the judicial system by those who normally would be unable
to hire legal representation because such agreements provide a res
for the payment of the attorney's services.U But, by limitihg the
possible fee to only the highest ethically agreed upon contigency fee,
some attorneys might be hesitant to take a case in which the client
has previously discharged an attorney. If not hesitant, the second at-
torney still might demand a higher than normal, but still ethical,
contingency fee. A second problem is raised when a client retains
over a period of time three separate attorneys and the highest fee
contracted is for one-third of the settlement. The attorneys' compen-
sation could be minimal while the expenses could amount to more
than the allowable attorney's fees. Also, the court will have to
decide which was the highest ethically agreed upon contingency fee
contract."4
In addition, the court construed contingency fee contracts as
conditioning payment "upon performance of all or substantially all
legal services necessary to accomplish settlement or other disposi-
tion [of] the claim . . . 6 Thus, an attorney who has completed
62. Id.
63. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at EC 2-20 provides:
[Clontingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in
the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical bases of their
acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circumstances, provide the
only practical means by which one having a claim against another can economical-
ly afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his
claim, and (2) a successful prosecution of the claim produces a res out of which the
fee can be paid.
EC 5-7 states:
The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a
lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally makes it undesirable for
the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise
to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation .... Although a
contingent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of
litigation, a reasonable contingent fee is permissible in civil cases because it may
be the only means by which a laymen can obtain the services of a lawyer of his
choice. ...
64. "The question of the value of legal services rendered by an attorney is one
that comes within the expertise of the trial judge." Lynch v. Burglas, 286 So. 2d 170,
172 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
65. 373 So. 2d at 117.
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"substantially all" of the work required in a case and is deserving of
the full contingency fee might be forced to share part of his compen-
sation with a second attorney whose work the first attorney had to
duplicate partially. If the supreme court continues to insist that the
client pay only one contingency fee, an exception should be made for
those attorneys who are discharged after completing "substantially
all" of the work required.
The Reasonableness of the Fee
The supreme court relied strongly on the factors in the Code for
determining the reasonableness of a contingency fee. "Resort to the
Code . . . also will have in the future a salutary effect of assuring
that unethical conduct, such as solicitation on the part of one at-
torney of another's client, will not be countenanced or rewarded."".
This approach is consistent with the adoption of the Code as "rules
of the court."51 The rationale departs, however, from the previous
Louisiana practice" and common law rule" of determining the value
of attorneys' services on the basis of quantum meruit.
Subsequent to Saucier, Calk and Scott, in Simon v. Metoyer" a
discharged attorney who had been hired on a flat fee basis sued his
client for his fee. The court held that quantum meruit was the prop-
er basis for determination of the value of the attorney's services.
The court distinguished Saucier as being a departure from a long
line of cases establishing quantum meruit as the general rule. "The
instant case is distinguished from Saucier in that it does not involve
a contingent fee contract or special legislation aimed at protecting
the attorney's rights under such a contract."'" This conclusion was
not the result of adherence to the Code's guidelines for the deter-
mination of the value of attorneys' fees, which considers as a factor
whether "the fee is fixed or contingent."" The factors in the Code
should therefore be sufficient to allow a determination of the fair
value of an attorney's services, even in a flat fee contract. Arguably,
these factors should be used especially in light of the court's
reliance on the Code to regulate the profession and because they are
66. Id. at 118.
67. See note 4. supra.
68. Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726 (1949); Suceession of Carbajal.
139 La. 481, 71 So. 774 (1916).
69. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Grandbush, 162 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
70.. 383 So. 2d 1821 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 1324.
72. CODE-OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at DR 2-106(B)(8) (em-
phasis added).
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specifically tailored to the needs of the legal profession. Further-
more, while numerous Louisiana cases have been decided on the
basis of quantum meruit, the concept is a common law device and its
appropriateness in a civil law system is debatable."
The Earned Fee Concept
The supreme court's decisions reflect an awareness of the need
to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, especially in mat-
ters concerning the attorney-client relationship.' Of particular im-
portance is the court's adoption of the requirement of an "earned
fee"" before an attorney may demand compensation ethically. This
result can have a valuable impact on the integrity of the profession
if the judiciary will continue to require performance by the attorney
before a fee may be collected.
For illustration, the "earned fee" rationale can benefit the public
and the profession in preventing unethical referral fees. Disciplinary
Rule 2-107 clearly prohibits the payment of referral fees from one
attorney to another who is not his partner unless three conditions
are met." First, the client must consent, after full disclosure, that a
division of fees will be made; second, the division must be in propor-
tion to the services performed and the responsibility assumed; and
third, the total fee must not be clearly excessive. Attorneys who ac-
cept divided fees from other attorneys violate the Code if the fee is
for the mere referral of a client and the attorney has actually per-
formed no work. The practice of sending "finder's fees" is con-
demned by the Code but is a practice of many attorneys." Never-
theless, ethically, an attorney cannot accept such a fee unless it tru-
ly represents an "earned fee" and reflects the proportion of the ser-
vices performed and authority assumed.
Another way in which the "earned fee" approach could prove
beneficial is when an attorney named in a will to represent the
estate does no work. The Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that an
73. See Nicholas, Unjust Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 37 TUL. L.
REv. 49 (1962).
74. See 373 So. 2d at 108 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 117.
76. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6. at DR 2-107. ,The pro-
posed Model Rules of Professional Responsibility would allow the payment of referral
fees if the client consents and all attorneys assume responsibility for the representation.
See FINAL DRAFT OF THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Rule 1.6(d)
(1981).
77. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. supra note 6, at EC 2-22. See also An-
not., 6 A.L.R.3d 1446 (1966).
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attorney named in a will to handle a succession has an irrevocable
interest and cannot be dismissed by the heirs if he wants to perform
the work."9 The first circuit noted in one case that "we wish to make
it clearly understood that the agency thusly established is ir-
revocable in the sense that it may not be cancelled or terminated by
the executor or heirs of the testator without the consent of the at-
torney." 9 Under recognized law in Louisiana "a testator may impose
such conditions on his gratuities as he sees fit."8 Possibly the courts
in the future will find this interpretation of the laws of descent and
distribution"' to be in opposition to its rules contained in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. If the courts continue to allow such
stipulations, an attorney could not ethically accept any compensation
from the estate if he does not handle the succession. In light of the
"earned fee" rationale of Saucier, such an acceptance of compensa-
tion would contravene the Code. While a testator may name the at-
torney in his will, the designation is not the bestowal of a gift but
rather the privilege to handle his succession. Any compensation paid
such a designated attorney to secure his release is clearly not an
"earned fee" and therefore under Saucier would be prohibited.
Conclusion
The primary reliance on the Code of Professional Responsibility
for the regulation of the attorney-client relationship denotes the
supreme court's desire to maintain judicial control over the legal
profession and not to be constrained by legislative directives. This
approach is correct under the provisions of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion as a proper assertion of the court's plenary power. The legal
profession is essentially a self-regulated one and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility evidences the bar association's attempt to pro-
vide such regulation. The decisions in Saucier, Calk, and Scott
should strengthen the judiciary's (and -the profession's) control over
individual members of the bat and therefore represent a positive
step in the area of attorney-client relations.
Sterling Scott Willis
78. Rivets v. Battistella, 167 La. 766. 120 So. 289 (1929); Roberts v. Cristina, 323
So. 2d 888 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Succession of Zatarain. 138 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962); Schiro v. Macaluso. 126 So. 244 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
79. Succession of Zatarain, 138 So. 2d at 169.
80. Rivets v. Battistella, 167 La. at 770, 120 So. at 290.
81. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1527.
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